
creditrisk monitor[®]

NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP BANKRUPTCY CASE STUDY

FILED ON 05/07/2020



CreditRiskMonitor's warning of Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC's ("Neiman Marcus") bankruptcy risk was determined by a combination of factors:

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This Bankruptcy Case Study contains financial statement information for Neiman Marcus that predated management's decision to cease filing with the Security and Exchange Commission on June 21, 2019.

MONTHLY AVERAGE FRISK® SCORE

CreditRiskMonitor's FRISK® score had been warning of financial stress at Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC for more than a year. We issued a special High Risk Report, dated Jan. 8, 2018 and <u>in-depth analysis</u> published Feb. 5, 2019, as conditions continued to deteriorate and become more troubling.

The company ultimately filed for bankruptcy on May 7, 2020.

Proposed unregistered offering of second lien notes to pay down term loans as well as fees and expenses on other debts.

Bond trustee and private equity firm sued over alleged illegal asset transfer of Mytheresa, which would reduce available collateral. After no longer filing with the SEC, or "going dark," sources indicated that total EBITDA declined by 13% year-over-year.

The FRISK® score is 96% accurate* in predicting the risk of corporate failure/bankruptcy over a 12-month horizon.
All FRISK® scores are recalculated every night for each subsequent 12-month period.

Third quarter net sales declined 9%, EBIT fell by 20%, and net losses expanded by about 57% year-over-year.

Would permanently close all off-price retail stores and coronavirus would cause remaining locations to be shut effective immediately.

CDICK® Coore	BANKRUPTCY RISK RELATIVE TO THE HISTORICAL AVERAGE			
FRISK® Score	FROM	TO		
10	0.00x	0.12x		
9	0.12x	0.27x		
8	0.27x	0.34x		
7	0.34x	0.55x		
6	0.55x	0.87x		
5	0.87x	1.40x		
¥ 4	1.40x	2.10x		
3 3	2.10x	4.00x		
₹ 2	4.00x	9.99x		
1	9.99x	50.00x		

While the risk of bankruptcy varies at each FRISK® score, 96% of public companies that eventually go bankrupt enter the FRISK® "red zone" prior to filing. A FRISK® score of 5 or less is an important warning sign.

^{*} FRISK® score accuracy of 96% is based on backtesting of U.S. public companies; results may vary by country.

THE FRISK® SCORE COMPONENTS

At the core of the CreditRiskMonitor® process is our 96% accurate FRISK® score, which indicates a company's level of financial stress on a scale of 1 to 10, based on the probability of bankruptcy over a 12-month horizon. When available, the FRISK® score incorporates a number of powerful risk indicators including:

A "Merton" type model using stock market capitalization and volatility Financial ratios, including those used in the Altman Z"-Score Model

Bond agency ratings from Moody's, Fitch, & DBRS Morningstar

Crowdsourced CreditRiskMonitor® Usage Data

<u>Crowdsourcing</u> has enhanced the accuracy and timeliness of the FRISK® score. We collect and analyze data patterns from thousands of CreditRiskMonitor® subscribers, including professionals from more than 35% of the Fortune 1000 and other large corporations worldwide.

The crowdsourcing advantage is even more powerful in our FRISK® score since many of the professionals who use our service are credit managers:


- Credit managers control one of the largest sources of working capital going into a company
- They are not held to the same "Fair Disclosure" restrictions that prevent non-disclosed information sharing on public companies
- Credit managers use a variety of non-public information sources such as their own company's management and sales representatives to be alerted to concerns in a public company's performance
- It is commonly known credit managers confidentially share information with other credit managers, thus collectively, their behavior helps to provide advanced insight to financial problems in public companies

Read more in Credit Research Foundation's quarterly journal article, "Assessing Public Company Financial Risk by Crowdsourcing the Research of Credit Professionals"


DO NOT MISS THIS - MANAGEMENT DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS (MD&A)

Making misleading or fraudulent statements in an MD&A is <u>against the law</u> – and Sarbanes-Oxley subjects CEOs and CFOs to heavy fines or even <u>jail time</u> for doing so. A vital feature of the CreditRiskMonitor service is the ability to quickly access a Company's Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) history. Let it sink in: there are no two people in the world with better knowledge of a company's liquidity risk than the CEO and CFO. More than any credit manager. More than any trade group. And they're personally liable if they're lying.


According to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), "MD&A should provide a balanced presentation that includes both positive and negative information about the topics discussed."



COMPANY REPORT DETAIL



FRISK® DEEP DIVE AND OTHER EVENTS




The FRISK® score relative to the broader Retail (Apparel) industry raised an additional red flag signaling heightened risk relative to peers, as well...

MAKING IMMEDIATE ATTENTION REQUIRED.

In early February 2019, CreditRiskMonitor advised that trade creditors should be prepared for a potential bankruptcy restructuring. In addition to the FRISK® score warning, another key consideration was the company's weak trailing 12-month interest coverage ratio at a troubling 0.8x, after including its allocated expenditures for store remodeling and development at Hudson Yards in New York City.

Over the remaining span of 2019 and 2020, the company's negative and restrictive covenants disallowed for any additional borrowings. Rapidly burning through cash, unable to access equity, and receiving creditor pressures from the potential asset transfer of Mytheresa, Neiman Marcus had no meaningful options left available to sustain liquidity.

By March 2020, the coronavirus pandemic led management to close its entire store base. This unforeseen event deepened its ongoing cash flow deficit and consequently forced the company into default and a bankruptcy restructuring by May.



The average probability of failure for SIC code 5311 (Department Stores) has increased 159% since 2007. Neiman Marcus was among the weakest names in the industry as evidenced by its FRISK® score of 1.

PEER ANALYSIS ON ALTERNATE SUPPLIERS AND CUSTOMERS



Neiman Marcus demonstrated bottom quartile ranking in key financial ratios (shown in red) versus its industry peers.

QUARTERLY PERFORMANCE RATIOS

Posted net sales declines year-over-year and recurring net losses

Poor interest coverage ratio and high cash burn rate

Performance Ratios - Sequential Quarters (Thousands of U.S. Dollars)

Period Ended	13 weeks 4/27/2019	13 weeks 1/26/2019	13 weeks 10/27/2018	13 weeks 7/28/2018	13 weeks 4/28/2018
Net Sales \$	\$1,057,240	\$1,394,120	\$1,104,391		\$1,166,270
% change	-24.16%	26.23%	-2.52%	-2.86%	-21.94%
Gross Margin \$	\$378,983	\$435,573	\$404,155	\$315,504	\$419,679
% change	-12.99%	7.77%	28.10%	-24.82%	-11.11%
% of sales	35.85%	31.24%	36.60%	27.85%	35.98%
change as % of incremental sales	n/m	10.84%	n/m	n/m	n/m
SG&A \$	\$258,608	\$309,223	\$276,761	\$281,316	\$280,223
% change	-16.37%	11.73%	-1.62%	0.39%	-12.95%
% of sales	24.46%	22.18%	25.06%	24.83%	24.03%
change as % of incremental sales	n/m	11.20%	n/m	n/m	n/m
Operating margin \$	\$41,211	\$43,490	\$43,487	(\$44,568)	\$51,117
% change	-5.24%	0.01%	197.57%	-187.19%	-14.67%
% of sales	3.90%	3.12%	3.94%	-3.93%	4.38%
change as % of incremental sales	n/m	0.00%	n/m	n/m	n/m
EBITDA \$	\$119,211	\$119,204	\$122,589	\$37,476	\$134,264
% change	0.01%	-2.76%	227.11%	-72.09%	-5.90%
% of sales	11.28%	8.55%	11.10%	3.31%	11.51%
change as % of incremental sales	n/m	-1.17%	n/m	n/m	n/m
EBIT \$	\$40,338	\$42,118	\$41,990	(\$45,449)	\$50,653
% change	-4.23%	0.30%	192.39%	-189.73%	-13.92%
% of sales	3.82%	3.02%	3.80%	-4.01%	4.34%
change as % of incremental sales	n/m	0.04%	n/m	n/m	n/m
Pre-tax income \$	(\$42,798)	(\$38,816)	(\$37,935)	(\$121,711)	(\$26,997)
% change	-10.26%	-2.32%	68.83%	-350.83%	-57.81%
% of sales	-4.05%	-2.78%	-3.43%	-10.74%	-2.31%
change as % of incremental sales	n/m	-0.30%	n/m	n/m	n/m
Net income (loss) \$	(\$31,183)	(\$29,006)	(\$28,171)	(\$75,303)	(\$19,881)
% change	-7.51%	-2.96%	62.59%	-278.77%	-105.34%
% of sales	-2.95%	-2.08%	-2.55%	-6.65%	-1.70%
change as % of incremental sales	n/m	-0.29%	n/m	n/m	n/m
Tax expense \$ Effective tax rate	(\$11,615) 27.14%	(\$9,810) 25,27%	(\$9,764) 25.74%	(\$41,008) 33.69%	(\$ 7,118) 26.36%
Depreciation expense \$					
% of sales	\$55,986 5.30%	\$53,930 3.87%	\$56,815 5.14%	\$58,729 5.18%	\$59,309 5.09%
				90.57%	
% of capital expenses % of PP&E, net (annualized)	116.02% 14.57%	116.08% 13.99%	151.08% 14.60%	14.98%	134.92% 15.19%
Capital expenditures \$	\$48,254	\$46,461	\$37,605	\$64,842	\$43,958
% change	3.86%	23.55%	-42.01%	47.51%	6.86%
% of PP&E, net (annualized)	12.56%	12.05%	9.66%	16.54%	11.26%
% of working capital (annualized)	32.12%	32.90%	28.19%	51.41%	32.86%
Interest coverage ratio	1.43	1.47	1.53	0.49	1.73
% change	-2.65%	-3.97%	212.13%	-71.58%	-7.96%
Free cash flow \$	(\$158,372)	\$106,666	(\$215,979)	\$19,605	(\$26,737)
% change	-248.47%	149.39%	-1,201.65%	173.33%	-112.64%
Source:	10-Q	10-Q	10-Q	10-K	10-Q
	6/11/2019	3/12/2019	12/6/2018	9/18/2018	6/11/2019

QUARTERLY LEVERAGE RATIOS

Unremitting
negative tangible
net worth over the
last five fiscal
quarters

Leverage Ratios - Sequential Quarters (Thousands of U.S. Dollars)

Total debt to
assets ratio
steadily trended
higher, indicating
increased balance
sheet risk

reriod Ended	4/27/2019	1/26/2019	10/27/2018	7/28/2018	4/28/2018
Total debt \$	\$4,940,915	\$4,762,208	\$4,857,893	\$4,652,578	\$4,666,996
% change	3.75%	-1.97%	4.41%	-0.31%	1.42%
Stockholders' equity \$	\$377,061	\$412,905	\$448,751	\$759,181	\$829,386
% change	-8.68%	-7.99%	-40.89%	-8.46%	-1.15%
Total debt to equity ratio	13.10	11.53	10.83	6.13	5.63
% change	13.62%	6.54%	76.64%	8.91%	2.60%
Tangible net worth \$	(\$3,969,080)	(\$3,956,138)	(\$3,943,787)	(\$3,859,991)	(\$3,825,285)
% change	-0.33%	-0.31%	-2.17%	-0.91%	0.25%
Total assets \$	\$7,359,000	\$7,266,309	\$7,462,477	\$7,545,903	\$7,649,220
% change	1.28%	-2.63%	-1.11%	-1.35%	0.29%
Total debt to assets ratio	0.67	0.66	0.65	0.62	0.61
% change	2.44%	0.68%	5.58%	1.07%	1.13%
Tangible assets \$	\$3,012,859	\$2,897,266	\$3,069,939	\$2,926,731	\$2,994,549
% change	3.99%	-5.62%	4.89%	-2.26%	1.40%
Short-term debt \$	\$29,426	\$29,426	\$29,426	\$29,426	\$29,426
Short-term debt % of total debt	0.60%	0.62%	0.61%	0.63%	0.63%
% change	-3.61%	2.01%	-4.24%	0.32%	-1.41%
Short-term debt % of working capital	4.28%	5.72%	4.78%	6.51%	5.28%
% change	-25.04%	19.45%	-26.48%	23.14%	-7.80%
Total liabilities \$	\$6,981,939	\$6,853,404	\$7,013,726	\$6,786,722	\$6,819,834
% change	1.88%	-2.29%	3.34%	-0.49%	0.47%
Total liabilities to equity ratio	18.52	16.60	15.63	8.94	8.22
% change	11.56%	6.20%	74.84%	8.72%	1.64%
Total debt to EBITDA ratio (annualized)	10.36	9.99	9.91	31.04	8.69
% change	3.75%	0.81%	-68.08%	257.16%	7.77%
Source:	11	1 10 40	10-Q	10-K	10-Q

Double-digit total debt to EBITDA ratio commensurate with extremely speculative borrower

12/6/2018

9/18/2018

6/6/2018

QUARTERLY LIQUIDITY RATIOS AND RATES OF RETURN

Majority of working capital tied to merchandise inventory	Liquidity Rati	ios - Sequer usands of U.S. Do		qi	Cash and uick ratios ndicated liquidity leficiency
Period Ended	4/27/2019	1/26/2019	10/27/2018	7/28/2018	4/28/2018
Current assets \$	\$1,438,371	\$1,325,133	\$1,481,895	\$1,311,860	\$1,383,007
% change	8.55%	-10.58%	12.96%	-5.14%	1.79%
% of short-term debt	4,888.10%	4,503.27%	5,036.01%	4,458.17%	4,699.95%
Current liabilities \$	\$751,438	\$810,243	\$866,882	\$859,684	\$826,193
% change	-7.26%	-6.53%	0.84%	4.05%	-2.26%
Working capital \$	\$686,933	\$514,890	\$615,013	\$452,176	\$556,814
% change	33.41%	-16.28%	36.01%	-18.79%	8.46%
% of sales (annualized)	16.24%	9.23%	13.92%	9.98%	11.94%
Cash \$	\$38,579	\$41,338	\$37,732	\$38,510	\$38,851
% change	-6.67%	9.56%	-2.02%	-0.88%	8.56%
% of short-te <u>rm</u> debt	131.11%	140.48%	128.23%	130.87%	132.03%
Cash ratio	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.05
% change	0.59%	17.24%	-2.90%	-4.68%	11.11%
Quick assets \$	\$90,447	\$77,800	\$86,974	\$72,199	\$91,450
% change	16.26%	-10.55%	20.46%	-21.05%	17.17%
% of short-term debt	307.37%	264.39%	295.57%	245.36%	310.78%
Quick ratio	0.12	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.11
% change	25.42%	-4.29%	19.40%	-24.12%	19.94%
Current ratio	1.91	1.64	1.71	1.53	1.67
% change	17.04%	-4.33%	12.02%	-8.84%	4.15%
Source:	10-Q 6/11/2019	10-Q 3/12/2019	10-Q 12/6/2018	10-K 9/18/2018	10-Q 6/6/2018

Jnable to					
generate ny positive returns	Rate of Retur	n - Sequent sands of U.S. Doll			
Period Ended	13 weeks 4/27/2019	13 weeks 1/26/2019	13 weeks 10/27/2018	13 weeks 7/28/2018	13 weeks 4/28/2018
Return on equity	-7.55%	-6.46%	-3.71%	-9.08%	-2.37%
% change	-16.84%	-74.19%	59.13%	-283.16%	-102.87%
Return on total assets	-0.43%	-0.39%	-0.38%	-0.99%	-0.26%
% change	-8.25%	-4.93%	62.12%	-280.75%	-105.40%
Return on tangible assets	-1.06%	-0.97%	-0.94%	-2.54%	-0.67%
% change	-8.54%	-3.47%	63.06%	-280.48%	-105.47%
Source:	10-Q 6/11/2019	10-Q 3/12/2019	10-Q 12/6/2018	10-K 9/18/2018	10-Q 6/11/2019

ANNUAL STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS

Cash from operating activities					
negative ent of Cash Flows	- Year-over	-Year - Sta	andardize	d - Year to	Date
	(Thousands of	· ·			
Period Ended	39 weeks 4/27/2019	39 weeks 4/28/2018	39 weeks 4/29/2017	39 weeks 4/30/2016	39 weeks 5/2/2015
reliou Eliucu	7/2//2017	7/20/2010	7/27/2017	Reclassified 4/29/2017	3/2/2013
Cash Flows from Operating Activities:					
Net income	(\$88,360)	\$326,434	(\$165,456)	\$1,136	\$47,831
Depreciation/depletion	236,558	253,738	267,286	271,582	262,446
Deferred taxes	(974)	(418,611)	(99,880)	15,785	(49,207)
Non-cash Items	3,200	43,735	156,850	3,354	18,576
Changes in working capital	(285,789)	7,469	(228,938)	(144,275)	(156,833)
Total cash from operating activities	(135,365)	212,765	(70,138)	147,582	122,813
Cash Flows from Investing Activities:					
Capital expenditures	(132,320)	(109,754)	(161,486)	(231,993)	(183,016)
Other investing cash flow items, total	(17,200)	n/a	0	(896)	(181,727)
Total cash from investing activities	(149,520)	(109,754)	(161,486)	(232,889)	(364,743)
Cash Flows from Financing Activities:					
Financing cash flow items	(2,707)	(332)	(5,359)	0	(265)
Issuance/retirement of stock, net	(1,401)	(266)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Issuance/retirement of debt, net	289,070	(113,424)	225,073	85,746	127,930
Total cash from financing activities	284,962	(114,022)	219,714	85,746	127,665
Foreign exchange effects	(8)	623	3,682	2,869	n/a
Net change in cash	69	(10,388)	(8,228)	3,308	(114,265)
Net cash-beginning balance	38,510	49,239	61,843	72,974	196,476
Net cash-ending balance	\$38,579	\$38,851	\$53,615	\$76,282	\$82,211
Supplemental Disclosures:					
Cash interest paid	\$261,509	\$189,030	\$245,130	\$231,950	n/a
Cash taxes paid, supplemental	(\$6,617)	(\$3,713)	(\$699)	(\$16,106)	n/a
Source:	10-Q 6/11/2019	10-Q 6/6/2018	10-Q 6/13/2017	10-Q 6/13/2017	10-Q 6/12/2015

NEWS ALERTS: A TIMELINE OF CONCERNING NEWS ITEMS

		isfy a distressed exchange.
05/20/2019	Moody's Investors Service	Moody's assigns Caa2 to Neiman's proposed senior secured tern loan
		ne sales stagnated, two major blows to the prospects of a recovery ments added to the retailer's losses as well.
06/11/2019	CRMZ News Service	Neiman Marcus posts a bigger loss and CEO 'not satisfied' with results
	announced the hiring of a xury merchandising offeri	new President and Chief Merchandising Officer, in the hopes of ngs and the product mix.
09/03/2019	CRMZ News Service	Neiman Marcus Appoints Lana Todorovich as President and Chie Merchandising Officer
		corporate staff from its Dallas, Texas headquarters to save on tional restructurings are a common red flag.
11/14/2019	CRMZ News Service	Neiman Marcus Axes Nearly 100 Jobs Amid Restructuring
		ing its cash position to improve, executive management disclosed i perating margins had deteriorated even further.
12/18/2019	CRMZ News Service	Neiman Marcus Earnings Fall, But Cash Position Stabilizes
		outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic and Neiman decided to skip tal LP. The company also reportedly made bankruptcy preparations
	T	Luxury department store retailer Neiman Marcus Group skipped
04/16/2020	Reuters America	bond payment: letter
eiman Marcus t reducing the	entered into a restructuri	bond payment: letter ng support agreement with more than two-third of its lenders, aim debt load. Creditors would agree to provide \$750 million as an exit

ABOUT THIS REPORT/CONTACT CREDITRISKMONITOR®



CreditRiskMonitor® is a financial risk analysis and news service that helps credit, supply chain and financial professionals stay ahead of and manage risk quickly, accurately and cost effectively. More than 35% of the Fortune 1000, plus over a thousand other large corporations worldwide, rely on our financial risk coverage of over 58,000 global public companies.

CreditRiskMonitor® Bankruptcy Case Studies
provide post-filing analyses of public company
bankruptcies. Our case studies educate subscribers
about methods they can apply to assess bankruptcy
risk using CreditRiskMonitor's proprietary FRISK® score,
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